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  Grant Tavinor
Abstract
Videogames are one of the most significant developments in
the mass arts of recent times. In commercial terms, they are
now among the most prominent of the mass arts worldwide.
This commercial and cultural success does not exhaust the
interest in videogames as a mass art phenomenon because
games such as Grand Theft Auto IV and Fallout 3 are
structurally radically different from previous forms of mass art.
In particular, the ontology of videogames, the nature and
identity of their works, and how they are instanced and
evaluated is a departure from the familiar mass arts of film
and popular music. This paper explores these differences in an
attempt to fit videogames into a theory of mass art, but also
to provide guidance on the issues of criticism and evaluation
that surely follow from their ontological distinctiveness.
Key Words
art and technology, interactivity, mass art, ontology,
videogames.
1. Videogames and Ontology
Videogames are one of the most significant developments in
the mass arts in the last fifty years, and they have become
one of the most recent concerns of philosophical aesthetics.[1]
While the videogame Grand Theft Auto IV is notorious for its
graphic depictions of violence and crime, it also provides a
richly immersive experience where the player enters the
fictional world of Liberty City as a character within that world.
Mayhem, and art, ensues. There is reason to expect that our
dealings with games such as Grand Theft Auto IV have
ontological implications of the kind found in the arts generally,
that is, issues concerning the ontological status of the artistic
works and their varied instances, the nature of artistic
performances, and the role of creators and consumers vis-àvis works of art and their performances.[2] Indeed, I contend
that understanding the ontology of videogames shows what is
genuinely distinctive about this new art form.
Generating most of the interest in the ontology of videogames
should be the observation that what is ultimately depicted in
videogames is largely shaped by the activities of the player.
The world of Grand Theft Auto IV is not fixed at the time of its
production, as seems the case with traditional mass art
fictions; rather, the game exists as a set of possibilities
awaiting the input of the player. This interactivity has a
profound impact, not only on the artistic structures of
videogames, but also on the appreciative practices that attend
them. The participatory role the player takes in videogames,
that is, in making decisions and performing actions that affect
what is depicted by the work, sets videogames apart from
other forms of mass art. What, then, is the work appreciated
in Grand Theft Auto IV that is so dependent on the decisions
and actions of the player for its display? Indeed, why should
we think that videogames constitute single works, when
individual playings can generate such widely divergent
instances? Settling these ontological questions is a

prerequisite for understanding the appreciative practices of
videogames and formulating an art-critical framework for
them.
2. Videogames and Mass Art
What is the ontology of a work of art? In aesthetics, a theory
of ontology is meant to explain how individual art works or art
kinds exist. As well as clarifying what appreciators engage
with when they encounter an art work, the ontology of art
works has a bearing on issues such as what it is for art works
to be created or destroyed and on work identity. One of the
most significant ontological distinctions in the arts is that
between multiple instance and single instance art works.[3]
Some art works are embodied in single objects: the
Washington monument, for example, finds its singular location
in the National Mall in Washington D.C. Other works can have
multiple instances. The National’s album, The Boxer, can be
can be instantiated at multiple discrete locations and times by
playing the disc or digital file on an audio player.
It is relatively clear that videogames count as multiple
instance works, and so, on some level, are appropriately
grouped with such works as films, plays, music albums, prints,
and novels. It seems reasonable to conclude that the
ontological schema appropriate for videogames will be of a
kind that captures the multiple instance ontology in these
other works. Videogames are also obvious candidates for
being what Noël Carroll referred to as “mass art,” a form of art
that Carroll argued is in part defined by its multiple instance
ontology.[4] Carroll claimed that an art work is mass art if
and only if
1. x is a multiple instance or type art work, 2. produced
and distributed by a mass technology, 3. which art work
is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural
choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism,
intended affect, and even its content) toward those
choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort,
virtually on first contact, for the largest number of
untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences.[5]
On the face of it, conditions (1) and (2) seem unproblematic in
regard to videogames. First, Grand Theft Auto IV has multiple
displays because the game can clearly be played by many
different people in what Carroll referred to as different
“reception sites.”[6] Second, game consoles and personal
computers are quite obviously mass technologies.
Condition (3) might seem to be more problematic given that
many popular videogames such as Grand Theft Auto IV can be
very demanding of a player’s skills and game knowledge, and
so rely on a base of relatively experienced players for their
popularity. A lack of gaming skills, which are themselves quite
diverse and are built up slowly over a significant period of
gaming, can be a real barrier to new players experiencing
these games (as non-gamers will quickly discover if they try
playing Grand Theft Auto IV). Many so-called “hardcore”
videogames are at least as inaccessible to the uninitiated as
are avant-garde works of art.[7]
There are two responses available here. Carroll also allowed

that mass art works do involve some previous awareness of
the genre or form of art that one is dealing with, so audiences
of mass art are not entirely untutored. Much of the tutoring
comes through formulaic repetition, an observation that is
equally apt for videogames.[8] The appropriate comparison
class for the category of mass art is avant-garde art, and
when this comparison is made it is quite clear that
videogames tend to sit alongside uncontested mass art works
because of their characteristic artistic structures and concerns.
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 is of a kind with military
thrillers and action movies, and Grand Theft Auto IV is very
derivative of crime films and television shows, such as Heat
and The Sopranos. Second, what makes demands on
videogame players is not necessarily game-specific knowledge
or taxing interpretative tasks, although games do demand
these to some extent, but the game’s physical challenge.
Carroll’s theory is not framed to account for videogames.
Therefore we should not judge his theory on the basis that it
does not account for the particularities that arise from
videogames’ distinctive combination of gameplay and art;[9]
nor should we assume that because he does not address this
issue of player skill, videogames are not, in his terms, mass
art.
Hence, and I think quite intuitively, videogames such as
Grand Theft Auto IV and the post-apocalyptic open-world roleplaying game Fallout 3 fit Carroll’s conception of a mass art
work. When we look more closely at the details of how
videogames work, however, it becomes clear that there are
some significant differences from mass art forms such as
movies, television shows, and music albums.
One of the most persistent and useful ways of framing the
multiple instance ontology seen in mass art works is in terms
of the logical type/token relationship.[10] The type/token
relationship prevails where a type can be instantiated by a
number of particular objects, such as the movie Star Wars,
which can be tokened by any number of showings, while not
being identical with any one of its instances. Considered as a
type, Star Wars is an abstract object and is instanced by a
number of concrete particulars through which we come to
know the type. Though the type is known through its
instances, the instances themselves are determined by the
nature of the type.[11] What is it about the type that does
the determining, that is, what is shared between instances by
which they are a type? In the case of Star Wars, it is the
representational structure that constitutes the work; that is,
the collection of audio-visual presentations that depict a
plotted sequence of events, such as that Luke Skywalker
leaves his home world of Tatooine, joins the Rebellion, and
destroys the Death Star.
All properly formed instances of Star Wars share this artistic
structure, even though, by itself, the shared structure might
not be sufficient since a genetic component may also be
necessary for identity. Upon travelling to a galaxy far, far
away where they encounter an ancient alien civilization and
discover an audio-visual artifact looking and sounding identical
to what they know as the movie Star Wars, our space-faring
descendents might wonder whether this actually is the movie
or merely bears a strong (and exceedingly unlikely)

resemblance to the work, perhaps being, instead, a dramatic
reenactment of actual historical events in which a historical
figure, Luke Skywalker, helped to defeat the Empire by
destroying the Death Star. Settling the issue, presumably,
would be the discovery of some relevant kind of causal or
intentional link, or lack thereof, to the historical creative act
that first tokened the movie.[12]
3. The Artistic Structure of Videogames
Taking guidance from this, we might think that a shared
artistic structure between an art work and its instances, and a
genetic relationship between those instances and an original
creative act, are key to the multiple instance relationship in
mass art. But how apt is this logical schema for videogames?
Videogames share much in common with the artistic structure
found in Star Wars in that their displays are comprised of
audio-visual presentations.[13] Moreover, they are both
works of fiction.[14] All instances of Grand Theft Auto IV
comprise a fiction, set in Liberty City and detailing the actions
of a recent Serbian immigrant to the city, Niko Bellic, and his
experiences as he aids his cousin, Roman. But Grand Theft
Auto IV as an artistic structure is quite different from Star
Wars. For example, whereas in Star Wars the viewer is safe to
expect certain events from a properly formed screening of the
film (that Luke will leave Tatooine, and that the Death Star will
be destroyed), the player of Grand Theft Auto IV cannot have
such expectations of the plot of the game. In some playings of
the game, after Niko decides to deal with his nemesis Dimitri
in a drug deal that ultimately goes wrong, Roman Bellic will be
killed by an assassin’s bullet meant for Niko. In other playings
these events do not occur; instead Niko’s love interest, Kate, is
killed in a drive-by shooting, events that are caused by Niko’s
earlier decision to take revenge on Dimitri rather than deal
with him. This difference results because the narrative of
Grand Theft Auto IV has several branching points where,
depending on what the player chooses, different sequences of
plot events are set into motion.
The narrative of the game is also ordered by the mission
structure typical of Grand Theft Auto games, where narrative
cut scenes are cued to missions, explaining the task to come,
but also situating the action in the plot of the game. Because
Grand Theft Auto IV is a sandbox game the sequence in which
the missions are taken is optional. Some missions do not even
have to be played through to advance in the game. Thus, in
instances of the game, the sequence of narrative events also
shows considerable variation. Moreover, when we look at the
bulk of the fictional events, what is depicted from moment to
moment in the gameworld, particularly those events that make
up the gameplay of Grand Theft Auto IV,[15] no two instances
of the game will ever portray exactly the same fiction. There
are some variations in showings of Star Wars (in some, in their
meeting in Mos Eisley Cantina, Han Solo shoots Greedo
unprovoked; while in others he appears to be retaliating,
Greedo having shot first and missed), but these are
attributable to the film having different versions, George Lucas
having returned to the work in 1997 to make certain
(notorious) changes. The variations between instances of
Grand Theft Auto IV, which are a great deal more numerous

and significant than this, are not due to different versions of
the same work but arise through different playings of a single
version.[16]
All of this means that while sharing broad similarities, different
instances of Grand Theft Auto IV will vary in terms of the
sequence and detail of the fiction they present. Role-playing
games, such as Fallout 3 and The Elder Scrolls: Oblivion, go
even further than Grand Theft Auto IV in how variable their
individual playings or instances can be by allowing players
considerable say over the qualities of the player character and
their contribution to the gameplay and narrative events in the
game.
Here we are struck with an ontological difficulty. The notion of
artistic structures was introduced to explain, in part, alongside
genetic considerations, what constitutes the type/token
relationship in multiple instance art works. In the case of
mass art works like films, the type/token relationship functions
because tokens share an artistic structure because they are
tokens of that type. But given the extensive variation seen in
videogames, through their audio-visual presentations and the
nature of fictional events thus depicted, there does not seem
to be a single artistic structure shared between all instances.
With Fallout 3, any two playings are extraordinarily likely to
differ in terms of the name, gender, ethnicity, and appearance
of the protagonist; the length of the game; the events,
direction and conclusion of the narrative; and the bulk of the
very basic fictive events that make up Fallout 3 as a work of
fiction. There will be representational elements common to all
playings, but the individual playings rendered through these
elements are likely to show a wide variance.
To return to Carroll’s definition of the mass arts, this variation
in instances might seem a complication for fitting videogames
under his definition. In explaining condition (2) of his
definition, Carroll claimed that “that mass art work is a type
whose numerically distinct tokens are identical in the sense
that two dimes of the same minting are identical.”[17] Thus,
while videogames might clearly seem to be mass art, they do
not quite fit Carroll’s characterization of works with multiple
identical instances, since the instances of a videogame work
are not qualitatively identical in terms of their audio-visual
displays in the way that instances of a film are. Alternatively,
if we are quite certain that videogames are mass art works,
this feature of videogames might prove difficult for the
definition itself, showing that it is not adequate to cover all
cases of mass art. Thus, either videogames are not mass art
works or, if they are, Carroll’s definition of mass art is not
capable of explaining why they are.
Indeed, given the lack of a common fiction, playings of Fallout
3 can be understood to not instantiate new tokens of a single
work but new works in their own right. Different playings
might be seen as different works sharing artistic elements such
as characters and settings, in much the same way that an
author might set multiple works in a single fictional setting, or
that works of fan fiction might exploit an established artistic
setting. In fan fiction, hobbyist authors take the worlds and
characters of established fictive canons, such as Harry Potter
or Buffy the Vampire Slayer, to take two popular examples,

and write original works involving the established fictive
content. Fallout 3 might be seen as a work generator that
allows the player to determine a number of open variables or
representational place-holders in order to create new works of
fiction. In this case the player might count as an author of a
unique work in the same way that a fan fiction writer counts
as one.
I think that this is a radical claim and, if at all possible, we
should avoid concluding that playing Grand Theft Auto IV and
Fallout 3 produces a number of unique works. First, there are
relatively clear intuitions on the part of creators, players and
critics that instances of the game count as displays of a single
work. This is most evident from the growing critical literature
on videogames, much of which is predicated on the
assumption that the videogame that is the subject of a piece
of criticism is the very same work that players will experience
when they play the game.
The realization that Grand Theft Auto IV is a single work with
many displays seems crucial to its appreciation because part
of what one appreciates about the game is the range of
instances it generates. Certainly one can play through many
games in a shallow manner intending merely to get to the end
and unconcerned with the scope of possible variation, but
increasingly games encourage multiple interpretive playings.
Philip A. Lobo illustrates this quite nicely when he argues that
Grand Theft Auto IV is able to make interesting observations
about freedom and responsibility because it has a branching
narrative in which the ramifications of the player’s choices are
manifested through differing outcomes in the gameworld, as
discussed earlier here in the case of the alternating deaths of
the characters Roman and Kate.[18] Furthermore, unless the
player realizes that this aspect of the narrative is a contingent
structure, perhaps by replaying it to see how the narrative
progresses had he chosen differently in his dealings with
Dimitri, then he will not grasp the statement made in the
narrative. But even if nothing of great narrative significance
hangs on a player’s decision, the player must realize that
things could have gone differently in order to make sense of
his character’s agency in the gameworld. That a single work
can produce multiple fictions is crucial to the player freedom
that is central in open-world videogames.
Finally, as I will discuss later, there are cases of artifacts that
come very close to being genuine work generators, and that
consideration of these cases shows what gives rise to new
works rather than variable instances of a single work.
4. Videogames and Variation
While it is likely that videogames are mass art works, one of
their ontological precedents comes from outside the mass arts.
I suggest that, in certain respects, videogames are more like
jazz performances than film or popular music. In some
multiple instance art works, the artistic structure that is shared
between the instances of a work may be less richly defined
than is the case with mass art forms such as film.[19] Jazz
performances are not mass art works, of course, because their
production does not employ mass technologies, even though
their recordings might. However, individual performances of a
jazz standard may share only a melody and a chord

progression and yet all count as performances of the work. In
the case of jazz standards, it is the creativity that the
performers are able to bring to performances, and the
performance tradition that warrants such variations, that
allows for the variation between instances.
While videogames might be similar to jazz standards in terms
of the variation between their instances, they differ in that the
variability of instances is made subject to production and
distribution by a mass technology, that is, the computer. In
videogames the variation between instances is generated not
by a performance interaction with a notated or remembered
precedent sound structure, but through the interaction of a
player with a technological artifact that encodes the artistic
elements of the work. Moreover, in videogames the
technological artifact encodes the scope of variation between
instances of a single game, setting boundaries on the possible
playings of that game.
It might be argued that these facts are also true of some
paradigm non-interactive works, and so do not count as real
differences between videogames and other, non-interactive
works. Granted, in some non-interactive art works the
technological artifact used to perform a work places
constraints on the works that can be produced with the
artifact, so that, for example, the works produced by a piano
are limited to having a certain range of notes, being within a
particular range of volumes, and having the timbral qualities
specific to that instrument. But the technological artifacts
underlying videogames stand in a different relationship to their
works. Though a piano makes possible a limited range of
artistic properties in its works, these artistic possibilities are
general to all of the works that the piano can be used to
produce. In the case of videogames, the artistic possibilities
are specific to a single work because the relevant
technological artifact is designed to produce that work alone.
Furthermore, in the case of the performing arts, the variation
between instances that counts toward the identity of the work
produced comes from an external source, such as a
remembered sound structure or from the improvisational input
of the performer. In videogames, the variations are derived
from the artifact itself through the act of playing.
As a result we might credibly say that videogames
artifactualize the artistic variations also seen in the performing
arts, and Carroll’s definition might be saved by altering his
explication of the artistic structure that is delivered by mass
technology. In videogames, this is not a determinate artistic
structure but a technological artifact that, when interacted
with, can produce a range of such structures. The exact
nature of this technological artifact will be addressed in the
final section of this paper.
My rejection above of the idea that individual playings of
videogames produce new art works implies that there is a
further relevant difference between the performance arts and
videogaming, which also partially explains that rejection. Since
the variation in instances of videogames arises from an
interaction with a technological artifact and not from a creative
performance, the items produced are not new art works in the
way that performances of jazz standards are. John Coltrane’s

performance of My Favorite Things is an art work quite
separate but obviously related to the Rodgers and
Hammerstein song on which his performance is based. But
with videogames, we do not consider one gamer’s playing of
Grand Theft Auto IV as meriting art work status itself, even if
it is a particularly adroit playing. Largely this seems to be
because we do not credit videogame players with creative
intentions of the kind performance artists have, as is evident
from the fact that we do not typically pick out individual
playings for aesthetic praise. As Aaron Smuts notes, “the
performance of a videogame is not normally evaluated
aesthetically.”[20] The playing of Grand Theft Auto IV is not
itself an art work but a playing of an art work. In this
respect, playings of videogames align with Carroll’s judgment
that screenings of films are not themselves artistic
performances.[21]
Videogames are like films in being a mass art form and so
allow for multiple instances of the game to appear
simultaneously in different reception sites. And yet, they
seem like jazz works in allowing for a degree of variation
across instances that is not seen in traditional mass arts, even
though videogame playings are not themselves artistic
performances. The ontological schemas appropriate to mass
arts like film and the performance arts such as jazz seem to
partially overlap because videogame works, which are subject
to distribution by mass technology, embody the variations that
only arise in jazz works through a performance. They do so
because they employ the potential of that most recent of mass
technologies, the computer.
The key issue in explaining the ontological peculiarities of
videogames thus seems to be how the artistic instance,
playing, or token of a videogame is generated through an
interaction with a technological prop. We might refer back to
how such instancing occurs in other forms of mass art. Carroll
noted that, though essential for explaining the notion of
multiple instance art works, the type/token distinction is
ultimately not “fine grained enough” to capture what instances
an art work in the various arts, and that there are variations in
the manner of instancing in multiple instance forms of art.[22]
A theater performance, Carroll argued, is instanced by an
interpretation of a script; a film is instanced by the screening
of a template. In each of these cases there exists an
intermediate artifact that is not itself the art work, but which is
essential if the art work is to be instanced. But, to reiterate
the conclusions of the this section, Grand Theft Auto IV, like
other videogames, exists, not as a determinate artistic
structure that might be rendered on a number of instances
from a template or a script, but as a web of representational
possibilities embodied in a technological artifact from which
any number of quite distinct token artistic structures might be
produced.
5. The Ontology of Videogames
What, then, is the artifactual basis of videogames that allows
for this ontological peculiarity? There are a couple of false
leads to avoid. First and most obviously, the relevant artifact
is not the disk or digital file that is used in the distribution of
the game. Physically, the playing of a game begins with acts,

such as placing a disk in a drive or downloading a file from a
server, and then starting it. Increasingly, games also involve
online activity, so that the origin of much of the game content
derives from a location distal to its physical playing. Some
online games, such as RuneScape, are played directly on
internet browsers, employing graphical applications such as
Java. The disk, digital file, or internet application is not the
game but merely a means of distributing the game, and thus
is a key part of the technology that lends support to the
concept of videogames being mass arts.
Digitally encoded disks and downloads are means of
distributing the game program, and hence it might be thought
that the game itself is the program that is distributed by these
means. This cannot be correct, however, because a single
game can be given different program instantiations, as often
happens when a game is designed to run on different
hardware platforms. Moving a game from one platform to
another, common since at least the 1970s, is called “porting
the game,” though for commercial reasons videogame releases
are increasingly cross-platform at the outset. Grand Theft
Auto IV can be run on PlayStation 3, X-Box 360, and a PC,
and the different platform instantiations involve different
programs. The differences between the varied program
instantiations of the game are driven by the differing hardware
and software demands of the various game platforms, both at
the developer and user ends of the process.[23]
A very obvious example of the variation in hardware demands
is the differences in control peripherals between different
gaming platforms. On PlayStation 3, the program running
Grand Theft Auto IV must specify the use of a game pad; on a
personal computer, the program specifies a keyboard and
mouse. But in either case, these control variations do not
affect the videogame that is being played; rather they are
ascribed to the varied programs running the game. In fact,
there can be perceptible differences in single videogames as
generated by different platforms. For example, a common,
critical practice is the comparison of the graphics of a single
game from one hardware platform to the next, comparing, for
example, the graphics on Grand Theft Auto IV run on
PlayStation 3 and X-Box 360.
As such, there must be something shared between programs
that establishes game identity and hence the ontology of
games. It is here that I call on Dominic Lopes’ theory that
games and computer art works—and videogames, which share
aspects of both—are ontologically grounded in algorithms.[24]
Grand Theft Auto IV, like chess, has a game algorithm, but
where the algorithm of chess specifies the movement of pieces
on a board, Grand Theft Auto IV involves events in a
fiction.[25] An algorithm is here defined as a functional item,
and as such it is useful for capturing game ontology because
by being substrate independent, the functional analysis allows
us to see how a game type can have multiple instantiations
and can exist in different media. Moreover, algorithms can be
implemented in different computer programs, thus providing
an explanation for the problem noted above of how a single
game might find different program instantiations across
different platforms. What is shared by all is a single game
algorithm.

Does this ontological posit of a game algorithm actually
resemble anything that games designers would recognize in
the programs they design? In fact, this broadly functional use
of the term ‘algorithm’ does not seem to be typical of the use
of the term in game design. Games designers might speak of
an algorithm involved in a graphical shader, for example, but
in this use they would be referring quite specifically to the
transformations that allow the shader to perform its particular
task in rendering the graphics, such as adding volumetric
detail to a texture. Thus conceived, algorithms solve
computational problems. Furthermore, algorithms are typically
defined as having terminations, but the objects being invoked
here can often be run indefinitely because there is no set
problem that they are meant to solve. Rather their function is
to generate an ongoing display drawing on the inputs of an
interactor (or even without the player’s input); this is often
referred to as the “game loop.” Thus the use of ‘algorithm’ as
a game algorithm is applied much more grandiosely than in
many technical uses, and in all likelihood would prove jarring
to most game designers. It is, however, aimed at solving
ontological issues, and it is not clear that games designers
typically have any interest in these sorts of concerns.
Perhaps closer to this sense of algorithm is the term ’game
mechanic,’ which is used in game design to refer to the
functional components of gameplay. But even this does not
quite fit the broad sense desired here because designers
typically speak of a game mechanic in a singular sense, as a
unit of game design specifiable in isolation from other game
mechanics, and that might find its way into a single game or
be shared between different games. The use I intend for
‘game algorithm’ obviously refers to the conjunction of such
game mechanics that combine to form a whole game. In a
game like Grand Theft Auto IV, this collection of game
mechanics is extensive.
Even given these clarifications about their functional nature, it
is unlikely that the ontology of videogames can be defined
solely with respect to game algorithms. Algorithms, being
functionally defined, are neutral in relation to their material
instantiation, and so they can be given different
interpretations. The meaning of the term ‘interpretation’ here
draws on the sense in which logical formulae in propositional
logic can be given different interpretations by filling in their
variables. Or to draw a sense that has a particular resonance
in these ontological debates and to which I have already
referred, the sense in which a theatrical play can be given
different interpretations through costume, set design, and so
forth.[26] In both of these cases an abstractly defined thing is
given an instantiation in a material medium, and with
traditional games this is the fact that allows even a single
game of chess to move between media. However, with
videogames the nature of the material interpretation of the
game algorithm seems necessary to game identity and, so, to
ontology.
Illustrating this most clearly is the issue of game “mods.”
Game modding involves users altering or creating new content
for a game, which is then distributed so that other users can
play the modified game. One example comes from The Elder
Scrolls: Oblivion, where a popular mod added cats and rats to

the gameworld. Some games develop a significant modding
community, and developers have even engaged with the
modding community by giving users access to specifically
designed modding tools. Fallout 3 has done this in the form of
the “GECK” (Garden of Eden Creation Kit), a level-building
application downloadable from the game’s official site.[27]
Not only can such mods change the character or appearance
of a game by making animations or textures look more
realistic, or adding new monsters or objects; they can also
impact the identity of the game.
The most famous such example of modding is the
development of Counter-Strike from the first-person shooter,
Half-Life. This interaction, even though it was with the
algorithm at the basis of Half-Life, did not produce an instance
of the game but instead an entirely new game. This is because
the Counter-Strike mod involved the creation of a new set of
artistic properties; Counter-Strike replaced the science fictionthemed content of Half-Life with a more realistic counterterrorism military scenario. As such, the Counter-Strike mod
of Half-Life is an example of how a change in the
representational content has a bearing on work identity in
videogames. Of course, the gameplay in Counter-Strike does
differ from Half-Life, but one can imagine an even stricter
mod, where an unmodified game algorithm is given a new
interpretation in terms of representational properties. If the
new art design of the game was sufficiently original, there
would likely be little hesitation in referring to the resulting
work as a new game.
The existence of game engines also bears out this ontological
point. A game engine is an executive computational structure
that is increasingly common in videogames, and is responsible
for binding together game-mechanics, representations, control
means, and their functional scaffolding into a coherent whole.
Game engines are often proprietary pieces of software that
facilitate the ease of production and execution of videogames.
I noted earlier that we might consider videogames as “work
generators” rather than as works with a number of instances,
only to reject this. But some game engines come very close
to functioning as work generators because they allow
developers to fill in a range of representational variables, such
as art and level design, in order to create original works.
Again, this illustrates that representational content is a key
factor in individuating works. Anyone who has played both
Fallout 3 and Oblivion should be convinced of this point. On its
release, many people noted that Fallout 3 was basically
Oblivion “with guns,” because the games shared the same
game engine and much of their gameplay. But no one really
confused Fallout 3 for Oblivion. Fallout 3 and Oblivion differ in
their game algorithms, but one can imagine a case of a game
engine also including quite specific game mechanics, perhaps
consisting of generic first-person shooter gameplay, that
allowed users to fill in the representational variables of
character, object, environment and sound design. The result
would surely be a new videogame, although a derivative one
in having a generic game algorithm. One suspects that
something similar is occurring in the production of videogame
clones, which are videogames that hew very closely to popular
precedent games, differing only in various aspects of art
design.

All of these observations tease out an important ontological
point, which is that although an algorithm may be necessary to
videogame identity, it is not by itself sufficient. What is also
necessary is that the game algorithm is interpreted in terms of
a set of representational aspects, such as art, character, level,
and environment design, because changes in these qualities
impact on identity in videogames. This artistic structure is
composed of a number of discrete depictive aspects, such as
polygonal 3D models, animations, virtual cameras, physics,
environmental sounds and music, dialogue, 2D elements, and
graphical artifacts like shaders.[28] In game design circles
these are commonly called the artistic or representational
“assets” or the “front-end” of the game. This is similar to a
point made by Lopes, where he emphasized the importance of
the “material” medium in computer art.[29] In videogaming,
these materials include the impressive range of computer
graphics techniques that has quickly developed over the last
few decades, and in which a large part of the aesthetic
interest in videogames lies. But the representational assets of
games also involve more complex artistic structures, such as
narrative cut scenes and large, designed 3D environments.
In fact, this functional separation between game algorithms
and representational assets is often evident in practice and not
only in theory. In game design practice, the game mechanics
and art assets are often treated separately, so that a designer
might modify a videogame to alter the character, environment,
and narrative design without altering the game mechanics.
This can sometimes happen very late in the design process,
where building and refining the game have proceeded with
graphical models that are essentially placeholders made for
the purpose of the build. The narrative is often the very last
piece of a videogame’s artistic structure to be produced. Also,
at the early proof of concept stage in game design, it is
principally the game algorithm that bears the weight of
evaluation. Finally, the player-character design modifications
that are available to the player in Fallout 3 and similar roleplaying games also show how game algorithms are, in practice,
separable from the artistic design, although in this case it is
the player who is authorized to make such changes as a part
of the interactivity afforded by the game itself.
This, then, is my answer to the nature of the structures crucial
to the type/token relationship as it applies to modern
videogames. A videogame’s artistic structure consists of an
algorithm as interpreted by a set of artistic assets. Thus two
different videogames may share the same game algorithm;
what differentiates them is how this algorithm is specified by
artistic or representational properties. This constitutes an
important difference between artistic videogames and more
traditional games, such as chess, where it has been argued
that representational content is inconsequential for game
identity, and so a simple algorithmic theory of game ontology
might actually be appropriate.[30] Furthermore, we can use
this ontological theory to explain the variation in instances that
make videogames difficult for Carroll’s definition of mass art.
I take the above analysis to imply that Carroll’s definition still
holds in the case of videogames but with one revision: the
artistic structure in videogames is not an extant artistic
structure shared between tokens but a computational artifact
consisting of a game algorithm and representational assets

that can produce a range of such structures through the input
of the player.
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